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Abstract
The creation of open agent-mediated electronic marketplaces requires new architectures, capable of coping with
unreliable computational and network infrastructures, limited trust among independently developed agents, and
the possibility of systemic failures. In analogy with civil human societies, open marketplaces will benefit from
the introduction of appropriate electronic social institutions, whose role will be to help guarantee stability and
efficiency in the face of these challenges.  This paper presents a research methodology for designing and
evaluating such electronic social institutions. It also describes how the methodology is currently being applied
in order to design and evaluate robust open architectures for agent-mediated marketplaces based on the contract
net protocol.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Software agent technologies promise substantial increases in productivity by automating several of the most time-consuming stages
of electronic commerce processes. Agents are software systems, which are capable of interacting with other agents in a flexible
and autonomous way, in order to meet the design objectives of their creators (Jennings, Sycara and Wooldridge 1998).  In the
context of electronic commerce, we can already point to several examples of agents used to compare information about products,
buy products, sell products, etc. (Maes, Guttman and Moukas 1999). 
 
Electronic agent marketplaces are formed by collections of software agents, which interact with one another in order to
automatically negotiate and form partnerships or trade products and services through the Internet. In the emerging model of 21st
century electronic commerce, a variety of open electronic marketplaces will be competing with one another for participants.
Independently developed agents will be entering and leaving marketplaces at will, in pretty much the same way that human
investors enter and leave different financial markets today. The stakeholders of electronic marketplaces will, therefore, have an
interest in making them as attractive to prospective “customers” as possible. One expects that the most successful marketplaces
will be the ones that have low barriers to entry (in terms of required agent sophistication) and provide the best “quality of service”
guarantees (in terms of security, fairness, efficiency, etc.). The proper design of open electronic marketplaces thus emerges as an
important research and practical question.
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- Subcontractor remains capable/available
- Cost doesn't change
- Bid is correct and timely
- RFB is not cancelled or
changed
- Contractor does not die
- At least one acceptable bid
- Picks a good bid fairly
- No better options appear
- Contract matches RFB
- Contract is not cancelled or
changed
- Correct and timely results
- Subcontractor does not die or cancel
Figure 1.  Simplified Description of the Contract Net Protocol
Some of the protocol assumptions are listed in italics.
A lot of the early work on the design of agent market-
places focused on agent mechanism design, that is, on
the design of rules of behavior to be followed by
individual agents (Wellman and Wurman 1998). The
underlying assumption behind this line of work is that
if all agents follow the “right” mechanism, the
emerging society will exhibit stable and efficient
behavior.
Such research typically assumes that agents will be
homogeneous and rational, that their infrastructure will
be reliable, and therefore that their relatively simple
and “optimistic” rules of behavior will be “intelligent”
enough to avoid or cope with whatever deviant
behavior or systemic dysfunction they encounter. The
contract net protocol, for example, one of the best-
known mechanisms for structuring contractor and
subcontractor marketplaces (Smith 1980), owes its
simplicity to many assumptions about agent behavior,
some of which are listed in Figure 1. Although such
assumptions may be possible to guarantee in closed
environments, where all agents are developed by the
same team, they are becoming less realistic in the open
world of the Internet.
Designing efficient and robust open electronic marketplaces, whose participants will be independently developed software agents,
is a difficult problem. Some of the most important challenges include:
• Unreliable infrastructure. Unpredictable node and link failures may cause agents to unexpectedly die in the middle of
transactions, messages to be delayed or lost, etc. Open marketplaces must be able to gracefully cope with the notoriously
unreliable nature of the Internet.
• Limited trust. Independently developed agents can not always be trusted to follow the rules properly due to bugs, bounded
rationality, malice, and so on. For example, subcontractor agents may crash or fail to deliver a promised service on time,
contractor agents may refuse to pay, etc. Open marketplaces should be prepared to deal with potential fraud or other deviant
behavior.
• Possibility of systemic failures. Most market mechanisms, especially those simple enough to be reasonable for implementation
and efficient in execution in a large set of agents, will have “holes” in terms of the potential for unintended emergent
dysfunctional behaviors. This is especially true since agent societies operate in a realm where relative coordination,
communication, and computational costs and capabilities can be radically different from those in human society, leading to
behaviors with which we have little previous experience. It has been argued, for example, that the 1987 stock crash was due
in part to the action of computer-based “program traders” that were able to execute trade decisions at a speed and volume
that was unprecedented in human experience and thus led to unprecedented stock market volatility (Waldrop 1987). 
Human societies have successfully coped with similar challenges by developing social institutions that set and enforce laws (e.g.,
courts, police), monitor for and respond to emergencies (e.g., ambulance system), prevent and recover from disasters (e.g. coast
guard, firefighters), etc. In that way, civil societies allow citizens to utilize relatively simple, optimistic and efficient rules of
behavior, offloading the prevention and recovery of many problem types to social institutions that can handle them efficiently and
effectively by virtue of their economies of scale and widely-accepted legitimacy. Successful civil societies have thus achieved a
division of labor between individuals and institutions that decreases the “barriers to survival” for each citizen, while helping
increase the welfare of the society as a whole. In an analogous manner, we believe that the design of the right electronic social
institutions will be a crucial success factor in the new universe of open electronic marketplaces.
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Isolated examples of useful electronic social institutions have been proposed and analyzed by software agent researchers (for
example, reputation mechanisms in Zacharia, Moukas and Maes 1999). However, up to this date, there has been almost no
experience in systematically identifying the issues that arise when popular agent market mechanisms are used in an open
environment, as well as the electronic institutions that are needed in order to provide robust, stable, and efficient systemic
behavior.
Our work aims to fill this gap. Our research complements much of the current research in designing agent-mediated electronic
marketplaces by focusing on the design of appropriate social (shared infrastructure) mechanisms that complement the mechanisms
of individual agents in order to improve the flexibility, robustness, and efficiency of the resulting systems. 
2. TOWARD ROBUST, OPEN MARKETPLACES OF CONTRACT NET AGENTS
Our methodology consists of the following three steps: (1) systematic analysis of mechanism exceptions in an open environment,
in order to identify issues that may require the introduction of social institutions, (2) design of candidate institutions, and
(3) simulation-based experimental evaluation, in order to determine how the introduction of these institutions affects various
system properties. This section describes our ongoing work in applying this methodology to design and evaluate robust open
architectures for agent-mediated marketplaces based on the contract net protocol.
2.1 Exception Analysis
Given an agent society whose members interact using a given market mechanism, the first step in our methodology consists of
a systematic identification of possible exceptions that may arise in an open environment.
We define exceptions as any deviation from an ideal sequence of agent behaviors. We further distinguish exceptions into
infrastructure failures, protocol violations, and systemic exceptions. Infrastructure failures are exceptions due to the limited
reliability of computers, networks, and software. In the context of the contract net protocol, examples include contractor and
subcontractor agents crashing in the middle of transactions, messages getting lost or delayed, etc. Protocol violations are situations
where the behavior of an agent deviates from the agreed upon protocol. This may be due to malice, incompatible agent
implementation, or simply a programming bug. An example of a violation of the contract net protocol is a situation where a
contractor agent awards a contract to a subcontractor but later refuses to accept the results and deliver payment. Finally, systemic
exceptions describe unintended emergent dysfunctional behaviors, which are usually due to inherent weaknesses of the protocol.
For example, one potential systemic dysfunction of the contract net protocol that has been reported in the literature is resource
poaching: a situation where all subcontractors are tied up with low-priority tasks and several high-priority contractors remain
unsatisfied (Chia, Neiman and Lesser 1998). 
In our previous work, we have developed methodologies and tools that assist the systematic discovery and classification of
exceptions (Dellarocas and Klein 1998; Klein and Dellarocas 1999). Using these methodologies, we have performed a systematic
analysis of contract net exceptions, a subset of which are listed in Figure 2.
2.2 Design of Candidate Institutions
For each exception type identified by the previous analysis, we then design one or more handling mechanisms, i.e., processes for
anticipating it, avoiding it, detecting potential symptoms, and, finally, resolving it. This collection of processes forms the blueprint
for the social institutions of that society. Figure 3 presents a partial summary of the analysis performed for a sample exception
type, while Figure 2 gives a partial overview of identified handling mechanisms.
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– Matchmaker provides false
positives/negatives
– Monitor for failures and notify interested parties
– Use redundancy for fault tolerance
– Adaptive load balancing and mobility techniques
(for avoidance/recovery)
– Track reliability history of various components




– Subcontractor advertises fraudulent skills
– RFB canceled or changed
– Agent skills change
– Contractor refuses payment
– Monitor for protocol compliance and apply
penalties to violators
– Maintain reputation server and report violators
– Expel repeat violators from society (by removing




– No available agents due to resource
poaching
– No capable agents
– Better bid appears after award
– Better candidate appears after award
– No bids from one or more good candidates
– Biased bid selection
– Mechanisms depend on specific dysfunction. See
Figure 3 for examples of mechanisms for coping
with resource poaching.
Figure 2.  Partial List of Contract Net Exception Types and Handling Mechanisms.
Exception Resource poaching
Definition One or more high-priority tasks are unable to access needed subcontractors because they already have been
“grabbed” by lower priority tasks
Criticality This exception can have a high fairness impact when there is a significant variation in task priority and the
available subcontractors population can be oversubscribed.
Anticipation
Processes
P1: The potential subcontractor population is currently busy with low priority tasks, and a set of high-
priority tasks is expected.
Detection 
Processes
P1: The priority of the tasks that have the resources they need is less than the priority of those that do not.
P2: A high priority contractor does not get any bids for an offered task within time-out period.
Avoidance 
Processes




P1: Instruct subcontractors to suspend lower-priority tasks and bid on later higher-priority tasks.
Figure 3.  Exception Handling Rules for the “Resource Poaching” Exception Type
2.3 Experimental Evaluation
The final step in our methodology consists of performing simulation experiments in order to evaluate the effects of candidate
institutions on the agent society. To facilitate the rapid evaluation of a wide variety of societies and institutions, we have developed
a reusable experimental infrastructure, which consists of the following components:
• The problem solving agents, that is, the actual contractor and subcontractor agents in the case of marketplaces based on the
contract net protocol.
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• An exception handling service, which allows the rapid prototyping of a wide variety of social institutions. As described in
the previous section, institutions can be specified as sets of rules for anticipating, avoiding, detecting, and resolving
exceptions. The exception handling service provides a knowledge base for storing these rules. Upon initialization, the service
activates a number of “sentinel” agents, which enact the anticipation and detection rules. Sentinels work by monitoring some
of the communication between agents or by proactively querying agents about their status. Whenever they detect a likely
symptom, they trigger the diagnostic component of the exception handling service. After the exception cause has been
determined, the resolution component selects one of the resolution rules specified for this type of exception and activates
“firefighter” agents in order to enact it and bring the society back to an acceptable state. The exception handling service is
described in more detail in Klein and Dellarocas.
• The SimHazard agent world exception simulator (Shue 1999). SimHazard simulates the nodes, links, and other resources
of a large-scale computer network and can be used to inject instability to the system in a controlled, robust manner.
SimHazard can simulate node and link failures, slowdowns due to overload, and other effects inherent in large-scale networks,
such as the Internet. Problem solving agents, as well as “sentinel” and “firefighter” agents created by the exception handling
service, run on top of SimHazard. SimHazard thus provides a test-bed for studying the effects of various classes of exceptions
as well as the effectiveness of the candidate social institutions in addressing them.
The purpose of the experiments is to evaluate the effectiveness of the institutions designed during the analysis phase. Our
experiments consist of creating several interesting configurations of the target agent marketplace with and without social
institutions, letting the agents interact, and measuring a number of dependent variables (such as efficiency, failure rate, and so on),
which provide measures of the society’s ability to cope effectively with an unreliable infrastructure, limited trust, and systemic
dysfunctions.
3. CURRENT PROJECT STATUS
We have completed a systematic analysis of contract net protocol exceptions. We have also designed a set of social institutions
(specified as rules for handling each exception type) and have added this information to our exception handling service. A
comprehensive description of this analysis appears in Aryananda (1999).
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
– Scale: # of agents and # of transactions per agent
– Infrastructure dynamism: parameters that characterize how failure-prone
the underlying computer infrastructure is
– Task complexity: average/maximum length of contractual relationship
chains needed to achieve top-level tasks; degree of variation in task
priority (i.e. the extent to which task completion is “important”); time
criticality (i.e. the extent to which contract satisfaction is time critical).
– Agent heterogeneity: # of variations of contract net protocol present in the
agent population; some agents have deliberately been designed to violate
the protocol in various ways
– Presence of specific social institutions: enabled vs. disabled
– Quality of service (speed): ratio of
delay in task completion for
successful tasks
– Quality of service (robustness): ratio
of outright failures
– Tunability: task-priority-weighted
versions of the speed and robustness
QoS metrics above
– Overhead: ratio between time spent
on domain actions and coordination
with social institutions
Figure 4.  Summary of Independent and Dependent Variables
of Planned Simulation Experiments
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We have completed a prototype implementation of contract net agents and have specified in detail the simulation experiments to
be performed. Our experiments will vary important dimensions of the agent society configuration (Figure 4). Our goal is to
evaluate the effect of the various institutions on a number of dependent variables that act as measures of overall marketplace
efficiency.
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